By Emilia Irimia
The idea of identity is consistent with consciousness. What can we know about the heart ifit's nowhere to be found in the abdominopelvic cavity during a laparoscopy? We can only imagine that it must not be there.
This is the case when looking at the concept of self from a neuroscientific standpoint. Scientists have found cortical (more specifically, the cortical midline structures) implication as a result of self-related stimuli, present across all functional realms [1]. Although research is quite sound on the involvement of the cortex in creating the self, this isn't enough to describe its' neural basis, and it does nothing in correlating it with consciousness or aiding in discovery. Self, as in psychosocial identity [2], has been defined as either characteristic of reflection (self-as object, I) or a pre-reflective concept in rapport with actions of the self as an observer (self-as-subject, Me) [3].
Looking at Freud's psychosexual theory of personality development [4], we define three interacting systems of the human psyche and their transient roles in different stages of human
development:
1. the id: the office of innate and intrinsical sexual and aggressive behaviors (instinct and
uncontrolled impulses)
2. the superego is the moral compass; the superego is responsible for identity crises and feelings of guilt when one's actions deviate from the previously constructed ideal self
3. the ego is the mediator, which imparts from the id as a reaction to the demands of society (this is where we define aggression processing, sexual identity, etc., as results of innate instincts being molded by external influences).
We hereby observe that functioning members of society establish a balance of the three (the id is only freely flaunted in newborns). This is why individual development, implicitly identity, is asynergy of internal drive and external demands. Identity crises may happen when the second part isn't fulfilled; alas, group identification is precarious [5].
"All the world's a stage, and all the men and women are merely players". [6]
Erving Goffman [7] expands on this Shakespearean notion, a question of personal identity (the player/s) in interaction with society (the stage). In the era of subjecting ourselves to critique based on others' (public) images, it becomes all the more apparent that identity isn't a given, nor is it synonymous with individuality. As we have previously established [8], the vain brain distorts our reality on account of cultural, geographical, interpersonal factors with the purpose of creating a sense of self that allows belonging in the community defined by the previous factors. If you hang out with intelligent people, your memory will highlight moments where you shined academically. If they talk about
the stock market or maybe fraud detection systems, you'll be reminded of times when you
proposed interest in these topics. In aid of making sense of these memories comes rationality: it allows for your (vain) brain to define you as "smart", because your memories help you identify with the group identity. You're smart because the people around you are, and to belong, you have to be likened. If you hang out with, well, the opposite cluster of people... draw your own conclusions!
Using this representation of the self as a stencil for behavior, people act accordingly. They know(more or less) who they are, and so they perpetuate this sense of existence further into their social interactions. In everyday life, different plots unfold, but they all rely on varied expressions of this psychosocial identity as subject to some type of interplay. This way, the individuals alter their actions (definitory of the self) to fit the context.
Actors play a role where they deny the preexisting image they have of themselves in favor of taking on an identity that is foreign to them. They align their personalities with what's expected of them. As soon as the curtain closes, they're back to their everyday selves.
"We perform acts of identity following culture-specific stage directions that leave room for
individual expressivity." [9]
We respect these cues not only by dressing formally or upping the amp on our fancy vocabulary during job interviews, nor by pitching our voices higher when speaking to customers. We can never really "let loose", because that implies the forging of our existence as social beings when met with solitude. We can never exist unconstrained by external influences (age grading, gender typing, class stratification, etc.).
Everybody always acts.
Personal identity is contingent on continuity; we only really exist because we already existed before (but what is existence, really?)
References
Kelly, S., Bliss, T. M., Shah, A. K., Sun, G. H., Ma, M., Foo, W. C., et al. (2004).
Transplanted human fetal neural stem cells survive, migrate, and differentiate in ischemic
rat cerebral cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 101
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and Crisis. New York: WW Norton & Company.
James, W. (1890/1998). The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2. UK: Thoemmes Press.
Freud, Sigmund (1923). The Ego and the Id. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of
Psycho-Analysis, 1927.
Huskinson, Lucy and Murray Stein (eds) 2015. Analytic Psychology in a Changing World:
The Search for Self, Identity and Community. London and New York: Routledge.
Shakespeare, W., & Dolan, F. E. 1. (2000). As you like it. New York, NY, Penguin Books
Goffman, Erving. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday.
Sanitioso, R.B.,, & Wlodarski R. (2004). In Search of Information That Confirms a Desired
Self-Perception: Motivated Processing of Social Feedback and Choice of Social
Interactions,
Coulmas, Florian (2019). Identity: A Very Short Introduction. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
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