.png)
By Emilia Irimia
How does the empirical pursuit of understanding the self (and consciousness) within a neurocentric framework reconcile with the implications of determinism on our perceived
autonomy and free will?
Recent neuroscience research is providing insights into the brain mechanisms underlying self-consciousness and its connections to various areas of the brain, especially the prefrontal cortex (PFC) [1]. Interestingly, this research has suggested that self-consciousness may arise from a mechanism called 'neurocentrism', a process in which the neural systems of the brain are seen as central actors in the production of self-experience. This idea has generated some debate and philosophical qualms, with some researchers raising concerns that neurocentrism is a narrow and possibly even egocentric view of the brain and self [2].
"The self-conscious-mind acts upon [...] neural centers, modifying the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the neural events" [3]. From this quote, we can indubitably trace a connection between the concept of self and the autonomous brain, a link denied by philosophers of a non-reducible self - individualists. As previously established, the concept of self is reliant on a gestalt of factors, ranging from ones that can be traced back to a neural process (personal beliefs, face recognition - correlated to the left hemisphere [4], right frontal cortex [5], right lateral parietal cortex [6], medial prefrontal cortex [7] or self-reflection in the cortical midline [8]) to ones incontrovertibly exterior - agentive and normative, ecological and experimental elements of the self. This distinction makes reducing it impossible for self-consciousness to be deterministically attributed to neither the brain nor the universe—rather, the interaction between brain-body-environment maketh man.
Some theorists propose a more cultural model of self -consciousness that emphasizes the role of social, cultural, and linguistic influences in shaping our experiences and identities [9]. Certainly, this prototype seems to encompass the Philosophy of Mind enough to satisfy both the Feelers and the Thinkers.
Still, proponents of neurocentrism argue that it offers a more comprehensive account of self-consciousness than previous ones that have focused solely on cognitive or mental activities. Instead, neurocentrism seems to examine the interactions between cognition, emotions, and bodily processes, including the autonomic nervous system, in the generation of self-experiences. By recognizing the importance of these non-cognitive processes, neurocentrism is said to provide a more holistic understanding of self-consciousness. Certain practitioners are inclined to believe that mental ailments can not only be analyzed in the brain but also treated and prevented [10]. This affinity has led laypeople down the windy (and oh-so-steep) road of bringing to light and generalizing brain-based psychotherapies as an accessible and acceptable approach to treating and understanding mental illnesses (not to be confused with neurological disorders). In this way,
the debate and philosophical qualms around neurocentrism are ongoing, and the discussion is likely to continue.
But how can we reduce this Platonic doctrine of the soul, the incorporeal psyche to a material entity? Voluntary action (soul-> body), and sensory perception (body-> soul) are concepts in which we have to acknowledge the body as not a mere interactant (brain-behavior, in the
reductionistic sense), and bring about questions of Cartesian dualism.
Some researchers certainly refuse to, which has led to questions about the implications of neurocentrism in understanding the self in different contexts. For example, some researchers have raised concerns that neurocentrism favors an overly biological view of the self, leading to a narrow interpretation of psychological phenomena [2], [11]. Furthermore, there are ethical considerations that should be taken into account when exploring the implications of neurocentrism. Some researchers have argued that the idea of neurological predeterminism raises questions about the notion of free will and responsibility [12]. If self experience is determined by physical mechanisms, how can we hold individuals responsible for their actions?
The general idea of neurocentrism poses a unique set of challenges and implications for the understanding of human nature and self-consciousness. Inexpugnably, the uncovering of consciousness as a brain-centered concept or not may grant us enough reason to sit on our hands for however long, but, absurdly, it's Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia that has offered us the most certainty : “it would be easier ... to concede matter and extension to the soul than to concede the capacity to move a body and to be moved by it to an immaterial thing” [13].
Personally, I believe reducing the self to mere neural processes is akin to explaining the magic of a sunset only in terms of wavelengths and pigments. Boring and ignorant. What do you think?
References
Raccah O, Block N, Fox KCR. (2021) Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in
Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain. J
Neurosci.
Claus Halberg (2023) Neurosexism, Neurofeminism, and Neurocentrism: From Gendered
Brains to Embodied Minds, NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research.
Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The self and its brain. Springer-Verlag.
TURK, D. J., HEATHERTON, T. F., MACRAE, C. N., KELLEY, W. M., & GAZZANIGA,
M. S. (2003). Out of Contact, Out of Mind. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences
Platek, S. M., Loughead, J. W., Gur, R. C., Busch, S., Ruparel, K., Phend, N., Panyavin, I. S.,
& Langleben, D. D. (2006). Neural substrates for functionally discriminating self-face
from personally familiar faces. Human brain mapping
Lou, H. C., Luber, B., Crupain, M., Keenan, J. P., Nowak, M., Kjaer, T. W., Sackeim, H. A.,
& Lisanby, S. H. (2004). Parietal cortex and representation of the mental Self.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Fossati, Philippe, Hevenor, Stephanie J. Graham, Simon J. Grady, Cheryl.et al (2003). In
Search of the Emotional Self: An fMRI Study Using Positive and Negative Emotional
Words. The American Journal of Psychiatry.
D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2007). Facial expressions of emotion influence
memory for facial identity in an automatic way. Emotion
Gallagher, S. (2018). Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of
neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind. Constructivist Foundations
Lilienfeld, S. O., Schwartz, S. J., Meca, A., Sauvigné, K. C., & Satel, S. (2015).
Neurocentrism: Implications for psychotherapy practice and research. the Behavior
Therapist
Manzotti, R. (2021). The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem
fit. Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Rose S. P. (2005). Human agency in the neurocentric age. Philosophers and scientists resort
to dualistic explanations to reconcile the age-old dichotomy between determinism and
'free will', but agency is an integral part of human biology. EMBO reports.
Elisabeth, C. P. (2007). The correspondence between princess of Elisabeth of Bohemia and
René descartes. (Edited and translated by Lisa Shapiro). Chicago University Press.
Comments